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Introduction 
SUPREME COURT jUSTICE THURGOOD MARsHAll. observed during the bicentennial 
anniversary of the U.S. Constitution, ''We will 
see that the true miracle was not the birth of 
the Constitution, but its life ... "1 Brown v. 
Board of Education, the culmination of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund's legal cam-
paign to dismantle state-mandated segrega-
tion, was a pivotal moment that breathed life 
into the Equal Protection Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment. 2 Before Brown, the 
Reconstruction-era civil rights protections 
had been left for dead after decades of Jim 
Crow laws systematically denied African 
Americans the rights the Civil War Amend-
ments and legislation were meant to secure. 
For many years now, we have likewise faced 
the dismantling of the Second Reconstruc-
tion that is the legacy of Brown. Using the 
lens of our experience with the Equal Justice 
Society, this essay critically evaluates the legal 
and strategic significance of Brown for pro-
gressive social change today, particularly in 
light of the challenges posed by the success 
of the political Right. 
The Brown strategy 
O NE OF THE CLEAREST and most enduring models of success for the use of law for 
progressive social change was the litigation 
strategy of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
that led us from legalized Jim Crow segrega-
tion ism to the historic victory in Brown vs. 
Board of Education in 1954.3 LDF's ability to 
move from almost total blockage in the 
courts under the landmark Plessy v. Ferguson 
Page2 
m 1896 to the landmark Brown decision, 
which unleashed a 'judicial revolution" in 
civil rights law, was driven by long-term 
strategic planning.4 
The so-called "Houston Plan" devised by 
Marshall's mentor and predecessor as the 
NAACP's Special Counsel, Charles Hamilton 
Houston, combined the use of successive 
legal openings created by LDF litigation in 
highly conservative courts, the innovative use 
of social science, and collaboration with both 
centrist, progressive and, more rarely, radical 
civil rights organizations with links to varied 
sectors of society.5 
While the "Houston Plan" appears more 
seamless in hindsight than it actually was, 
there is no question that the strategic model 
of combining what came to be known as 
"impact litigation" with community-based 
media savvy, and well-organized social move-
ment groups set the standard for public 
interest litigation, and the creation of a cor-
nucopia of public interest law firms.6 Socio-
logical evidence has long played a vital role 
in civil rights cases. 
In a well-known footnote in Brown, the 
Supreme Court declared that it was persuad-
ed by social science that segregated school-
ing has a profoundly harmful impact on 
black children. 7 This was based on a state-
ment in the appendix to Marshall's brief for 
LDF, which was endorsed by 32 social scien-
tists led by Dr. Kenneth Clark, who had pio-
neered psychological tests using black and 
white dolls to identify segregation's injury to 
African American children.8 This kind of evi-
dence ultimately had a substantial impact on 
the nation's understanding of the psycholog-
ical costs ofracism.9 
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WHEN DR. CLARK was first asked by LDF to present evidence that school segre-
gation per se harmed black children, he 
recalls explaining to the attorneys that this 
was not yet possible because available 
research had not "isolated this single variable 
from the total social complexity of racial 
prejudice, discrimination, and segrega-
tion. "10 The Brown litigation team responded 
by assembling an impressive arsenal of 
research. In addition to Clark's famed white 
and black doll studies, they compiled 
research covering the environmental (as 
opposed to genetic) basis of learning; 
polling data of social scientists indicating 
90% viewed segregation as harmful; the psy-
chological, social, and economic impact of 
segregation; and-for good measure during 
the height of the Cold War-Gunnar 
Myrdal's research on the chasm between the 
concept of democracy and blacks' unequal 
status in America. 11 
Social science will not always make the dif-
ference between victory and defeat in anti-
discrimination litigation, as contemporary 
desegregation cases sadly demonstrate. 12 
However, its utility should not be underesti-
mated. As Michael Shifter and Priscilla Hayn-
er state in their discussion of law-related 
research and Ford Foundation grantees 
worldwide: 
Research helps to identify problems in need of 
reform; it bears witness to injustices that are not yet 
socially recognized; it initiates and informs public 
discussion; it documents problems when resolu-
tions are not yet possible; and it can lead to con-
crete proposals to improve conditions. Research 
can contribute directly to the development of pro-
posals for change, as well as actual policy. It also 
can contribute indirectly to the transformation of 
attitudes and intellectual culture.1' 
Today we again need to broaden our con-
ception of social science research and to 
cross-fertilize analytical frameworks rooted in 
disciplines and communities of legal practi-
tioners, scholars, and activists that have not 
traditionally worked together. 
PERHAPS IT IS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT now than in the days of Brown that social sci-
ence evidence can be used to analyze the 
many subtle forms of discrimination. This 
discrimination often resides in facially neu-
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tral institutional practices and policies that 
have a discriminatory impact. It also occurs 
without evil-minded individual actors but as 
a result of subconscious stereotyping and 
group-biased decisionmaking at multiple lev-
els in American society. 14 We are excited by 
the potential to harness the growing body of 
contemporary social science that measures 
and explains the prevalence of prejudice 
even among those who strongly believe they 
are committed to egalitarian ideals. 15 
The coherent vision that LDF and related 
civil rights organizations developed was suc-
cinct: "Simple Justice. "16 It was a vision that 
carried them a long way in framing both 
their internal ethic-why LDF and other 
progressive attorneys put in such long, back-
breaking and stressful work for genera-
tions-and in lighting a fire among a mass 
base rooted in the poorest and most 
oppressed sectors of society, as well as their 
"organic intellectuals" and "movement 
lawyers." It turned up the heat at top of the 
power structure, and even won some hearts 
and minds there too. 17 
The question of how to proceed strategi-
cally, however, was anything but simple. Was 
it best to go for broke and try to break 
through with a frontal attack on Plessy? To 
focus on highly political defense cases that 
would grab headlines and popularize the 
injustices of racist America (as the militant 
left favored)? Or to proceed with a long-
range strategy, one that bitterly divided the 
movement in the mid to late 1930s, as it did 
again in the 1960s once Plessy had been dis-
mantled?18 
At the beginning of the decades-long 
process of legally overturning Jim Crow, the 
most farsighted LDF leaders understood that 
a legal sea change would have to take place 
in American society for the ultimate objec-
tive of eliminating segregation to be 
achieved. They also believed that it was 
achievable through a step-by-step process. 
Understanding that "[l]aw [is] ... effective 
. .. always within its limitations, "19 as Charles 
Hamilton Houston stated, the long-range 
strategy was to combine the two-a definite 
target, not so far in the distance that it could-
n't be seen, but concrete enough to measure 
definite steps toward. 
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H OUSTON, according to Genna Rae McNeil, "was very aware of the degree 
to which [his strategy] differed from ideas of 
other civil rights/ civil liberties lawyers," who 
preferred an immediate and direct attack on 
segregation. Houston rejected such an 
immediate challenge for three reasons. 20 
First he noted, "We must never forget that 
the public officers, elective or appointive, 
are servants of the class which places them in 
office and maintains them there. It is too 
much to expect the court to go against the 
established and crystallized social customs, 
when to do so would mean professional and 
political suicide. ( ... ) We cannot depend 
upon the judges to fight ... our battles. "21 
This insight is relevant today in light of the 
increasingly right-wing judiciary that is on 
the bench, possibly for decades to come. 
Second, McNeil explains, Houston pre-
ferred the protracted approach because: 
[H]e did not view the campaign as an 
exercise in "legal handiwork." An effective 
program must involve the masses of blacks 
with their role being the initiation of action 
against inequalities and discrimination in 
education subsequent to the exposure of the 
evils. Yet in the course of his work Houston 
found many black people fearful of militant 
action within their own communities, and 
others, who were not directly facing debilitat-
ing discrimination, seemed apathetic about 
struggle. 'This means that we have to ... slow 
down until we have developed a sustaining 
mass interest behind the programs .... The 
social and public factors must be developed 
at least along with and, if possible, before the 
actual litigation commences. "22 
Third, according to McNeil, "Houston 
sought to proceed slowly building precedents 
to support equality because to his mind it was 
also important to neutralize the poor white 
masses and persuade them of the logic and 
justice of the NAACP position. "23 The 
NAACP's many legal victories in the 1930s and 
1940s, often frustratingly narrow, reflect this 
patient and disciplined approach.24 
I N MANY RESPECTS the overall strategy of the progressive legal movement stayed the 
same for a generation. The "impact litigation" 
model produced major landmark cases that 
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opened up broad avenues of social and politi-
cal change, and even had a movement-build-
ing impact as Brown and other victories 
against the entrenched Southern racist aris-
tocracy contributed to the emergence of the 
mass-based civil rights and other movements 
in the 1960s. This approach moved from 
strength to strength as specialized progressive 
legal organizations based on the strategic liti-
gation archetype emerged, and won land-
mark cases ranging from consumer rights to 
reproductive rights, to defendants' rights and 
breakthroughs in civil justice law and eco-
nomic rights. Legal advocates, working with 
countless grassroots and social justice activists, 
secured for progressive law a firm place in the 
American courtroom and, many thought, in 
black letter constitutional law. 
However, beginning in the late 1970s, the 
LDF impact litigation model came under 
attack from different directions. First, the 
model was a victim of its own success when it 
was adopted nearly wholesale by an emerg-
ing right-wing juggernaut of foundations, 
think tanks, political organizations, media 
assets, new religious right structures, and liti-
gation groups that are discussed at length in 
the next section.25 
Second, criticism grew from within the 
law schools and from community-based 
lawyers, who argued that "impact litigation" 
was an inadequate framework for defining 
and realizing progressive law. They highlight-
ed the model's inadequacies in conceptualiz-
ing and serving what Marl Matsuda calls "the 
Bottom "-poor and working people in mar-
ginalized communities "who have seen and 
felt the falsity of the liberal promise. "26 For 
example, Cheryl Harris argues: 
Thus, we are left with Brown's mixed legacy: 
Brown held that the Constitution would not coun-
tenance legalized racial separation, but Brown did 
not address the government's responsibility to 
eradicate inequalities in resource allocation 
either in public education or other public ser-
vices, let alone to intervene in inequities in the 
private domain, all of which are, in significant 
measure, the result of white domination.27 
I N ADDITION, the "impact litigation" model has also been criticized by adherents of 
Critical Legal Studies, feminist legal theory, 
and Critical Race Theory (CRT).28 One of 
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the most fundamental CRT critiques of the 
"impact litigation" model is that, despite 
appearances, it wasn't fully responsible for 
the major legal victories of the civil rights 
movement, which lay instead in the impera-
tives the United States faced at the height of 
the Cold War. 29 This claim, first articulated 
by Derrick Bell and developed by Mary 
Dudziak and others, argued that after years 
of losing civil rights cases, or at best winning 
narrow victories, the Supreme Court caved 
in to LDF in 1954 and "unexpectedly gave 
them all they wanted."30 Bell posed the ques-
tion of why the Supreme Court suddenly 
moved in 1954, and suggested that the 
domestic and international political interests 
of the United States dictated that it do so. 31 
American diplomats around the globe 
were concerned about the impact that 
domestic race discrimination and U.S. racial 
problems would have on world public opin-
ion at the height of the Cold War. According-
ly, in Brown the Justice Department inter-
vened for the first time in a school 
discrimination case, arguing, "It is in the 
context of the present world struggle 
between freedom and tyranny that the prob-
lem of race discrimination must be viewed. "32 
On another level, some CRT scholars target 
"colorblindness" as a framework for addressing 
America's racial problems, not just on theoreti-
cal33 and empirical34 grounds, but also as a 
strategy that responds to the needs of the poor 
and of oppressed social groups. They have 
argued that if any strategies, whether long-term 
or immediate, do not "relieve the distress of 
the poorest group-or worse, if they com-
pound it-we should reject them. "35 
OTHERS HAVE OBSERVED that traditional civil rights alliances have fractured in 
recent years. Julie Su and Eric Yamamoto 
argue that outside factors, such as the inten-
sity of the right wing onslaught, the complici-
ty of some liberal leaders and Democrats, 
and the effect of economic hard times that 
"breed insecurity, distrust and a search for 
scapegoats" have threatened progressive 
coalitions.36 Internal factors were also crucial 
in fracturing the traditional alliance.37 "For 
example, organized labor has long faced 
charges of racism, sexism, and homophobia. 
Established civil rights organizations repre-
senting people of color have been criticized 
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by the poor and by workers as increasingly 
irrelevant to their communities. Traditional 
alliances, facing continuing external hostility 
from traditional enemies, are also severely 
stressed by unresolved internal conflicts. "311 
Retrenchment and the Political Right Today 
T ODAY, we face another element in the equation: conservative think tanks and 
legal groups-backed by millions of dollars 
from leading right-wing foundations-have 
quietly crafted coordinated strategies to dis-
mantle hard-earned civil and human rights 
protections. 
Through careful melding of theory, policy, 
and frontline political action, these groups 
have worked to nullify affirmative action pro-
grams, limit federal court powers to monitor 
school desegregation, invalidate disability 
rights legislation, block laws to protect a 
woman's right to be free from violence, pre-
vent individuals from suing to ensure that fed-
eral dollars do not subsidize discrimination, 
and countermand state voter redistricting 
designed to ensure that votes of minorities 
count. The right is pushing the U.S. back 
toward a more divided, resegregated America. 
At the same time, progressive legal acade-
mics and social justice lawyers are encounter-
ing a growing disconnect between progres-
sive theory and practice. Progressive 
academics and social justice lawyers often 
seem to operate in separate realms: the for-
mer in the realm of concepts and critical 
theories, the latter in the realm of civil rights 
statutes, restrictive court rulings, and politi-
cally conservative judges. These groups are 
working toward a common goal without con-
necting concretely with each other, without 
coalescing on present-day strategies for 
social justice and without a clear, forward-
looking, comprehensive agenda. 
The Right's Strategy to Co-opt Brown 
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS, adopt-ing the successful strategies of the pro-
gressive legal movement, have become formi-
dable foes. Conservatives have borrowed 
heavily from the "impact litigation" model, 
and launched both large and boutique "public 
interest" law firms that specialize in bringing 
various types of litigation. This is evident in 
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the right-wing assault on affirmative action, 
which Lee Cokorinos analyzes as a division of 
labor in a single organizational complex.39 
Though all the participants have a legal focus, 
each pursues a different function within the 
overall effort to dismantle diversity: 
• The Center for Individual Rights does the 
actual litigating, from sending warning let-
ters to the university counsel through to 
Supreme Court oral argument; 
• The Center for Equal Opportunity does the 
academic research backup and media spin; 
• The American Civil Rights Institute works 
on the state-level ballot initiative track and 
with the media; 
• The right-wing ethnic and gender-based 
groups, such as the Center for New Black 
Leadership, Independent Women's 
Forum, and the Asian American Legal 
Foundation, to provide political cover and 
obfuscate the impact of racism, again par-
ticularly in the media; and 
• The Federalist Society Civil Rights practice 
group coordinates the strategic networking.40 
LIKE THE LDF's IMPACT LITIGATION strategy that led to Broom, this conservative anti-
affirmative action apparatus is not as seamless 
as the aforementioned cooperation implies. In 
fact, the Pacific Legal Foundation was set up 
in 1973 with financial backing from J. Simon 
Fluor of the Fluor Corporation and Richard 
Mellon Scaife with the goal of advancing con-
servative positions on government regulation. 
Soon corporate executives formed an umbrel-
la body called the National Legal Center for 
the Public Interest (NLCPI) to create regional 
bodies in different parts of the country to 
spread the Pacific Legal Foundation model 
nationwide. This effort failed when the region-
al offices began fighting among each other for 
turf, clients, and prestige.41 
NLCPI's lesson in failure, that the Right 
could not simply reproduce the impact litiga-
tion model by imitating its formal structures, 
was taken to heart by the heads of the foun-
dations on the Right and their funders. 
Eventually, the turf war problems were 
smoothed over when the Federalist Society, 
while retaining organizational indepen-
dence, brought on board the top echelons of 
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the conservative legal establishment. Second, 
right-wing foundations have invested heavily 
in core, long-term funding for think tanks 
and nonprofit media operations, which has 
clearly obstructed the ability of progressive 
social justice organizations. 42 This success 
certainly includes the impact of talk radio 
and TV "scream shows." Yet there is more to 
communications than simply gaining a sig-
nificant presence in the media to spin mes-
sages and perform rapid fire issue manage-
ment.43 Communications capacity also has a 
great deal to do with how well networks com-
municate with each other, which is some-
thing the right-wing foundations have heavi-
ly invested in. Strategic networking 
operations like the Federalist Society can be 
seen as mediating structures, a middle level 
capacity that feeds the whole movement 
within a particular subject-area, such as law.44 
Third, the Right has successfully turned net-
working into a political weapon. The Federalist 
Society has brought in scores of academics and 
public policy experts to shape the conservative 
movement's strategic litigation. These networks 
function to bring to the table different sectors 
including law, politics, lobbying, the religious 
0 h d 0 45 ng t, an corporate mterests. · 
Today's Dismantling of Civil Rights 
T ODAY WE FACE A PIVOTAL RETREAT from America's commitment to civil rights for 
all, particularly for those suffering most from 
historic forms of discrimination. Piece by 
piece, a divided Supreme Court has attempt-
ed to dismantle civil rights.46 The Court has 
been doing so under the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments, by requiring plaintiffs 
to meet an exceptionally high burden in 
proving discriminatory intent,47 invalidating 
affirmative action programs,48 limiting feder-
al court powers to monitor school desegrega-
tion, 49 rejecting proof of racially discrimina-
tory impact in death-penalty sentencing,50 
countermanding state voter redistricting 
designed to ensure that votes of minorities 
count,51 essentially gutting the Americans 
With Disabilities Act,52 declaring there to be 
no private right of action to enforce Title VI 
disparate impact regulations,53 and striking 
down state constitutional provisions that pro-
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vide Native Hawaiian elections as a measure 
of self-determination. 54 The Court has 
expanded state sovereign immunity under 
the Eleventh Amendment and restricted 
Congress's power under the Commerce 
Clause, which effectively leaves victims of 
state-sanctioned discrimination without mon-
etary remedies. 55 Certainly there are key 
cases in which the Court has upheld civil 
rights, but these are the exceptions.56 
I N MANY WAYS, the current Supreme Court resembles that of the Pkssy era. For exam-
ple, Norman Spaulding argues that the Rehn-
quist Court systematically ignores the federal 
government's obvious exertion of national 
power over the states, reflected in the Recon-
struction Amendments, instead favoring an 
amnesic return to the Court's ante-bellum ver-
sion of federalism. 57 In fact, the Rehnquist 
Court expressly relies on the precedents that 
dismantled the first Reconstruction in order 
to dismantle the second Reconstruction. 58 
The ink was hardly dry on the University of 
Michigan decisions when opponents of affir-
mative action stepped up their assault on 
diversity, declaring a campus-by-campus cru-
sade. They are threatening future lawsuits to 
intimidate school administrators into aban-
doning affirmative action programs in favor of 
ineffective race-neutral "alternatives." Ward 
Connerly, author of Prop. 209, and his Ameri-
can Civil Rights Institute announced the kick-
off of his "Michigan Civil Rights Initiative," 
modeled after Prop. 209. Connerly aims to put 
the initiative on Michigan's November 2004 
ballot, and is reportedly planning similar ini-
tiatives in Colorado, Missouri, Arizona, Utah, 
Florida and Pennsylvania. 
Worsening Segregation 
I N BROWN, the Supreme Court found per-suasive the social science demonstrating 
that segregated schooling has a profoundly 
harmful impact on black children.59 Fifty 
years later, today's social science reaffirms a 
similar lesson: racial and socioeconomic inte-
gration bring about enhanced educational 
and economic mobility for poor minority 
students.60 Justice Clarence Thomas voices 
indignation that "courts are so willing to 
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assume that anything that is predominately 
black must be inferior, »GI but this misses the 
point. The reality is that because of our bit-
ter history of racial subjugation, black and 
Latino students in highly segregated schools 
are far more likely to encounter concentra-
tions of poverty which are associated with 
poorly prepared teachers, a less rigorous aca-
demic curriculum, lower parental involve-
ment, and fewer instructional resources.62 
In short, for both working-class and mid-
dle-class Mrican American families, segrega-
tion blocks the pathway to acquiring human 
capital, wealth, and property. 63 Thurgood 
Marshall understood this only too well. In a 
1978 memorandum to the other Justices 
before Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke64 was decided, Marshall wryly 
explained, "The dream of America as a melt-
ing pot has not been realized by Negroes-
either the Negro did not get into the pot, or 
he did not get melted down. »Gs 
Despite these truths about the harms of 
segregation, a quarter-century of hard-
fought progress toward the integration of 
America's public schools has been steadily 
unraveling since the mid-1980s. Today, 70 
percent of Mrican-American students attend 
schools in which racial minorities are a 
majority, and fully a third are in schools 90 
to 100 percent minority.66 
RESEGREGATION is the unmistakable pat-tern over the last fifteen years. This is a 
consequence of the Supreme Court relaxing 
standards of judicial oversight, and federal 
courts dissolving more desegregation plans 
and making voluntary desegregation more 
onerous. A study by the Civil Rights Project 
at Harvard University found that in nearly all 
of the largest districts in the U.S., black and 
Latino students were more racially segregat-
ed from whites in 2000 than in 1986.67 For 
example, in the schools attended by the typi-
cal black student in Baltimore, New York, 
Miami, Memphis, San Francisco, and 
Philadelphia, only six to nine percent of the 
student body was white in 2000.68 
Ironically, once serious compliance with 
Brown began after years of intense resistance, 
the South actually had the highest levels of 
school integration in the U.S. during the 
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1970s and 1980s. 69 A grave threat to the con-
tinued life of Brown stems from the fact that 
between 1990 and 2000 public school segre-
gation in the South increased even though 
residential segregation decreased during the 
same period. 70 Unless there is change in 
direction in the courts or in the tendency of 
Whites to opt out of integrated schools, 
resegregation in the South is likely to worsen 
in the near future. In fact, many major 
school districts were released from desegre-
gation orders so recently that the effects are 
not yet reflected in the current data. 71 
Equal justice Society's Renewed 
Vision of the Brown Strategy 
THE EQUAL jUSTICE SOCIETY (EJS) emerged in 2000 from an ongoing dialogue 
among academics in the legal arena, schol-
ars, practitioners and activists engaged in 
progressive social change. EJS, a national 
institution based in San Francisco, is commit-
ted to bridging research and real-time 
activism, theory and practice, and transform-
ing American jurisprudence Moreover, EJS is 
committed to long-term and sustainable 
social justice built upon a foundation that is 
strategic, forward looking and understands 
that such systemic change is deliberate in 
planning and execution. 
The EJS unifies and organizes those who 
are interested in developing and executing 
innovative legal theories and strategies to elim-
inate the conservative bias of our legal system. 
With a membership of legal academics, prac-
ticing attorneys, policy experts, researchers 
and students, the Equal Justice Society serves 
as a catalyst and facilitator for new progressive 
legal strategies. EJS's goal is to achieve long-
lasting change in the law. There is a com-
pelling need in the U.S. to ensure effective 
coordination and communication between 
the progressive legal community and our allies 
in the social sciences and public policy 
disciplines. 
EJS provides a venue in which scholars, 
attorneys and advocates work together cre-
atively to develop strategic, coordinated legal 
theories in key practice areas. Grounded in 
respect for the Constitution, practitioners 
and academics will deploy these legal theo-
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ries to assist in the development of strong 
precedent that protects the civil and human 
rights of all. 
In addition, EJS works closely with social 
scientists, progressive institutes and think 
tanks. To ensure an actual change in the law, 
EJS understands that it is important to 
include people who are conducting the 
social science research, polling, and theory 
development, all of which will ultimately 
form the underpinnings of new legal theo-
ries and public policy. 
Afrl.rming Brown by Invigorating 
Afrrrmative Action 
APRIMARY EXAMPLE of EJS's mission as it relates to breathing life into Brown is its 
multifaceted work on affirmative action. As 
Wade Henderson, executive director of the 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, 
explains, improving the quality of K-12 educa-
tion and invigorating affirmative action are 
"inextricably linked."72 America's failure to pro-
vide equal educational opportunities in prima-
ry and secondary school translates into dashed 
dreams in higher education and beyond. Today 
nearly 200,000 more black men are incarcerat-
ed in prison than are enrolled in college. 73 
Affirmative action is a very personal issue 
for all of us, and that deepens our apprecia-
tion of its importance to our country's 
future. EJS executive director (and co-author 
of this essay) Eva Paterson, for example, 
graduated from Northwestern University, 
where she was student body president, and 
was admitted to UC Berkeley's Boalt Hall 
School of Law in 1972. That year, there were 
5,000 applicants vying for 270 spots in the 
first-year class.74 Paterson proudly embraces 
that being African American was a positive 
factor in the admissions process. She knows 
that, while she was strongly qualified, without 
affirmative action, her potential contribution 
to the Boalt community and the legal profes-
sion may have been overlooked. 
Boalt Hall is a telling example of why affir-
mative action is essential to the continued 
life of Brown. When the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 became law a decade after Brown, Boalt, 
not unlike the University of Michigan Law 
School and many other institutions of higher 
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learning, enrolled a first-year class with zero 
Mrican Americans. 75 It was only because of 
the adoption of affirmative action amidst the 
unrest of the late-1960s that Paterson's enter-
ing class at Boalt and the two classes ahead 
of her included an average of 34 Mrican 
Americans. 76 Now, because of Proposition 
209's ban on affirmative action at the Uni-
versity of California, Boalt Hall has come full 
circle. Mter six years of "race-blind" admis-
sions, an average of less than nine Mrican 
Americans have been enrolled at Boalt, 
which is three-quarters fewer than were 
there when Paterson was a law student.77 
I N LIGHT OF THE DEVASTATING IMPACt of Proposition 209 on education, employ-
ment and contracting in California, we knew 
that is was crucial for the Equal Justice Soci-
ety to be involved in, and to plan for the 
aftermath of last summer's Supreme Court 
ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger, the University of 
Michigan Law School affirmative action 
case.78 We knew that Proposition 209 and the 
Fifth Circuit's Hopwood v. Texas79 ruling were 
having a chilling effect on affirmative action 
across the country. Our research showed that 
in 1990, Mrican Americans were already only 
83 percent as likely as Whites to be admitted 
to a law school in the U.S., but between 1996 
and 2001 this figure plummeted to 59 per-
cent, and dropped from 92 percent to 73 
percent for Latinos.80 
Blending Theory and Practice in 
Grutter v. Bollinger Brief 
I N ANTICIPATION OF GRUITER, the EJS leader-ship, including Eric K. Yamamoto, of the 
University of Hawai'i Law School, Paterson, 
and EJS research director Susan Serrano, 
authored an amici curiae brief in support of 
the University of Michigan Law School that 
was joined by the Coalition for Economic 
Equity, an association of minority businesses 
in California; the Santa Clara University 
School of Law Center for Social Justice and 
Public Service; the Justice Collective; the 
Charles Houston Bar Association; and the 
California Association of Black Lawyers. 81 
Through a unique blend of social science 
research, critical legal theories, and case law, 
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our brief dissected the impoverished view of 
"colorblindness" advanced by the Center for 
Individual Rights and anti-affirmative action 
advocates. The brief also offered an innova-
tive approach to a threshold question not 
addressed by other amicus briefs: How much 
respect should the Court give to governmen-
tal programs designed to remove historically 
rooted group disadvantages and promote 
genuine equality? The amici team was 
extremely pleased by the Court's acknowl-
edgment that the rigorous "strict scrutiny" 
standard used to review governmental uses 
of race must take "'relevant differences' into 
account" and that "[c]ontext matters when 
reviewing race-based governmental action 
under the Equal Protection Clause. "82 
Heading Off Backdoor Resegregation 
at UC Berkeley 
D URING AND AFTER THE PROPOSITION 209 campaign, conservative scholars raised 
baseless arguments that too many students of 
color admitted with affirmative action were 
unqualified, in order to whitewash the reseg-
regation of the University of California.83 
Thus, we knew where things were headed 
last fall when John Moores, Chair of the UC 
Regents, leaked his confidential report on 
Berkeley admissions to the press and claimed 
that students admitted to Cal with lower SAT 
scores "don't have any business going to 
Berkeley. "84 Regent Moores clearly intended 
to replace comprehensive review at UC, 
which weighs students' accomplishments in 
light of the opportunities available to them, 
by repeating these inflammatory accusations 
about "unqualified students." 
Within days the Equal Justice Society was 
able to assemble a coalition including a 
dozen Berkeley faculty members and many 
civil rights and education groups. While the 
issue was still hot in the media, we produced 
an extensive policy report disproving 
Moores' claim that the SAT equals merit.85 
We showed that the SAT has virtually no 
value in predicting graduation rates at 
Berkeley (or other elite universities), and 
that misuse of the SAT would substantially 
erode socioeconomic and racial diversity as 
well as weaken the strength of the student 
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body at Berkeley.86 We were also able to offer 
other key research to the Regents, demon-
strating unfairness against poor and minority 
students, which facilitated Moores being 
strongly rebuked by his colleagues.87 
Post-Grutter Compliance Manual 
for University Officials 
~LLOWING THE SUPREME COURT'S Grutter 
.C and Gratz decisions, EJS coordinated and 
edited the collaborative efforts of three of 
the nation's leading law firms, Bingham 
McCutchen, Heller Ehrman, and Morrison 
& Foerster, in the publication of Preserving 
Diversity in Higher Education: A Manual on 
Admissions Policies and Procedures After 
the University of Michigan Decisions. The 
manual, which includes input from admis-
sions officers from a number of the nation's 
leading universities, is designed specifically 
for institutions of higher learning to develop 
affirmative action plans that can withstand 
judicial and policy scrutiny as a result of the 
Supreme Court's decisions. The Equal Jus-
tice Society also spearheaded a nationwide 
grassroots effort to preserve and promote 
affirmative action at law schools and univer-
sities. EJS mobilized professors, alumni, and 
students to monitor the status of affirmative 
action procedures at their schools and alma 
maters; explain to school administrators 
affirmative action approaches allowed under 
the Court's decisions; and work with faculty 
members and students to provide the politi-
cal energy to ensure that administrators 
remain committed to strong affirmative 
action plans. A website created by EJS, 
www.preserveaffirmativeaction.org, has a valu-
able array of up-to-date information, includ-
ing talking points, organizing materials and 
a media kit 
Conclusion 
A RMED WITH THE WISDOM of the Brown strategy, we must continue to forge last-
ing cross-boundary alliances with the acade-
my, practicing lawyers, philanthropy, media 
and policy-makers to remake civil rights law 
and practice over time into a viable tool of 
progressive change. This is a unique and 
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timely opportunity to work together across 
lines of race, national origin, gender, sexual 
orientation and disability in the courts, legis-
latures, city halls, schools, and community 
and religious institutions in pursuit of long-
term structural change.88 During the Brown 
v. Board of Education oral argument before 
the U.S. Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall 
argued, "Equal means getting the same 
thing, at the same time and in the same 
place."89 Now, fifty years after Brown, there 
exists great potential for us to work toward 
making that statement a reality for all. 
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